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Gone and Forgotten: Vinogradoff’s Historical Jurisprudence 
Lorren Eldridge† 
ABSTRACT 
Sir Paul Vinogradoff was once well-known for his historically contextualised approach to legal 
theory which held that legal ideas were the contingent products of social factors. Law was 
necessarily engaged with other subjects, and ‘historical jurisprudence’ could produce real insight 
into the nature of law - in part by placing theories such as analytical jurisprudence in context, 
evaluating and modifying theoretical models by reference to the contingent social facts of an era. 
This was part of the nineteenth century turn to ‘science’ in history and a focus on methodology. 
Sir Henry Maine argued that legal history proved the insufficiency of analytic theories, but his 
method met with many criticisms, some of which Vinogradoff sought to address. However, 
Vinogradoff’s insights have rarely been pursued or developed, with legal history favouring 
Maitland’s more doctrinal approach, and legal theory rejecting historical jurisprudence – at least 
explicitly. Despite its imperfections, historical jurisprudence offers a rich and valuable way to 
understand law, including to evaluate analytical models such of those of H L A Hart, and as a 
methodology for dialogue between comparative and historical legal scholarship. It has, in fact, 
continued to do so without explicit recognition in the 100 years since Vinogradoff’s death.  
Author Accepted Manuscript: Eldridge, L 2021, 'Gone and forgotten: Vinogradoff's historical jurisprudence', Legal Studies: 
the Journal of the Society of Legal Scholars. https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2020.41






Just because the lawyer has to keep to distinct rules, he will often be behind his age and sometimes 
in advance of it. His doctrine, once established, is slow to follow the fluctuations of husbandry and 
politics: while in both departments new facts are ever cropping up and gathering strength, which 
have to fight their way against the rigidity of jurisprudence before they are accepted by it…On the 
other hand, notions of old standing and tenacious tradition cannot be put away at once, so soon 
as some new departure has been taken by jurists; and even when they die out at common law such 
notions persist in local habits and practical life. 
- Sir Paul Vinogradoff1 
 
It is not difficult to find recent examples of scholarly work calling for a fresh consideration of 
how we use (or do not use) history in thinking about law. For example, Markus Dubber calls for 
a revival of historical analysis of law as a mode of legal scholarship which can ground and reveal 
critical norms, and contextualise them.2 Multiple Anglo-American essay collections and 
conferences in recent years have discussed the serious problem of how, if history is required in 
order to have a richer, more rounded discourse about law, we are going to use that history in our 
legal thinking.3 Brian Tamanaha even argues that we have been doing it all along, surreptitiously 
and without acknowledgement.4  In the context of this increased interest in ‘historicism’ or 
‘historical jurisprudence’, the obvious question arises – what does it actually mean to use history 
in this way? Contextualised legal thinking of any kind arguably offers richer, thicker,5 ways of 
                                                        
1 P Vinogradoff, Villainage in England (Oxford: Clarendon, 1892) p 212.  
2 M Dubber, ‘New Historical Jurisprudence: Legal History as Critical Analysis of Law’ (2015) 2(1) Critical Analysis of Law 1.  
3 For example, M Del Mar and M Lobban (eds) Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue  (Hart 2016). See also A Musson 
and C Stebbings, Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies  (Cambridge University Press, 2012);  a special edition of the Virginia 
Law Review entitled Jurisprudence and (its) History (2015) 101(4) Virginia Law Review; and M D Dubber and S Stern (eds) Special Issue, New 
Historical Jurisprudence & Historical Analysis of Law, 2:1 Critical Analysis of Law (Toronto, 2015). 
4 B Tamanaha, ‘The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory’ (2015) 56(6) William and Mary Law Review 2235, p 2237.  
5 For a recent discussion of the importance of methodology and the role of ‘thickness’ in thinking about law, see E Fisher, ‘Through ‘Thick’ and 
‘Thin’: Comparison in Administrative Law and Regulatory Studies Scholarship’ in P Cane, H C Hoffman, E C Ip and P L Lindseth (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See also on ‘thickness’ J Getzler, ‘Brian Simpson’s 
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understanding law, but it does not mean that all lawyers must become professional sociologists, 
anthropologists - or historians. What it does mean is consciously asking ourselves how we go about 
the rigorous academic study of law, and in answering that question recognising that there are a 
multitude of answers, most of them useful in some way, and none of them perfect. 
 
Modern models for contextualisation can be found, for instance, Critical Legal History as 
coined by Bob Gordon,6 and in Tamanaha’s ‘realistic socio-legal theory’,7 and a number of scholars 
in the last twenty years or so have generally urged that there we should be asking more of 
jurisprudence than legal philosophy.8 To modern lawyers, that ‘jurisprudence’ might primarily 
suggest legal positivism and natural law theory – the first especially dominates ‘legal philosophy’. 
But even if the many modern alternative schools of thought including CLS are set aside, we have 
collectively begun to remember that ‘a third major pillar of jurisprudence…has existed for several 
centuries as a rival’.9 Whilst this ‘third pillar’ is out of favour, Tamanaha argues that several of its 
core propositions are now ‘virtually taken for granted – a remarkable achievement for a theoretical 
perspective on law that remains all but invisible,’ even in modern positivist accounts which 
acknowledge the social nature of law.10 These principles also survive in various other disciplines, 
including what is now called sociology, for example through the works of Ehrlich, whose idea that 
                                                        
Empiricism’ (2012) 3(2) Transnational Legal Theory 127, 137-9. Simpson’s methodology had much in common with Vinogradoff’s, although 
Simpson himself was somewhat dismissive of his philosophy: see below n 179 
6 R W Gordon, ‘Historicism in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) 90(5) Yale Law Journal 1017; R W Gordon, ‘The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: 
Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument‘ repr in idem, Taming the Past (CUP 2017) 282; idem, ‘The Arrival of Critical 
Historicism’ (1997) 49 Stanford Law Review 1023. See further section 1 below.  
7 B Tamanaha, Realistic socio-legal theory: Pragmatism and a social theory of law (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
8 From the back catalogue of Legal Studies itself, A C Hutchinson, : ‘Casaubon’s Ghosts: The Haunting of Legal Scholarship’ (2001) 21 Legal 
Studies 65 calls for ‘ghost-busting’ ‘useful jurisprudence’ which ceases to claim universal, objective validity and instead embraces the richness 
and contingency of law, historical and otherwise. Ceri Warnock does something similar in a more immediately practical context when she calls 
for a less impoverished discourse about dynamic forms of adjudication in environmental courts and tribunals: ‘Reconceptualising specialist 
environment courts and tribunals’ (2017) 37(3) Legal Studies 391.  
9 Maine’s historical jurisprudence and Vinogradoff’s were both compatible with analytical jurisprudence, but they have not been used as such: 
R Cosgrove, ‘Sir Henry Maine: Historical Jurisprudence and Social Reform’ in idem, Scholars of the Law: English Jurisprudence from Blackstone 
to Hart (NYU 1996), p 119; p 144. 
10 Tamanaha, ‘Third Pillar’, above n 4, p 2237. 
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law interacted with social forces as ‘living law’ was influenced by Montesquieu, Savigny,11 and 
Roscoe Pound.12  
 
The outcome of this forgetfulness is that in jurisprudence, although less so in sociology, 
Savigny and Maine’s claims that law evolves in connection with society are taken for granted, 
without recognition of their provenance.13 Law is understood in social terms, but without any 
recognised jurisprudential tradition to match the idea,14 limiting our ability to fully understand and 
engage with what that means. Lacey thinks this gives historical jurisprudence ongoing interest:  
 
Whatever the weaknesses of that broad (and itself diverse) nineteenth and early twentieth-
century tradition in the history of legal theory, there is strong reason to think that 
something important was lost with its decisive and lasting marginalisation at the hands of 
an analytical jurisprudence which has no use for either its own or law’s genealogy.15 
 
If we seek to reverse the marginalisation and discuss ‘historical jurisprudence’, the response - 
if there is one - is usually to think of Sir Henry Maine and his infamous claim that the history of 
property law was the history of ‘progress’ from ‘status to contract’. The name of Sir Paul 
Vinogradoff may not even get a mention. But it was Vinogradoff who took up the baton where 
Maine had left it – not far out of the starting blocks – and turned historical jurisprudence into a 
viable method for asking about the nature of law.  The value of what he did, and its ongoing 
potential, can be demonstrated through a brief consideration of a topic both he and Maine spent 
a great deal of time on: legal custom.  
                                                        
11 ibid, p 2252, citing E Ehrlich, ‘Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence’ (1916) 29 Harvard Law Rev 582; idem , Fundamental Principles 
of the Sociology Of Law (Walter Moll trans, 1936).  
12 R Pound, ’The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence’ (1911) 24 Harvard Law Review 591.   
13 Tamanaha, above n 3, p 2261; In general, Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1029; idem, ‘Past as Authority’, above n 6, p 287. 
14 D Elliot, ‘The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review p 38; R Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study in Victorian 
Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p 213-215. 




Throughout its history, the English legal system has been plural in different ways, and 
when confronted with a multiplicity of courts, with varied procedures, practices and conceptions 
of law, the Hartian legal positivist model descended from Austin is of limited use, and cannot 
identify rules governing the political community as a whole.16 In the context of medieval Europe, 
the area on which Vinogradoff worked most, it was clear that a number of conceptions of law 
coexisted at the same time, interacted, and influenced each other’s development. The 
transformation from custom to officialised law had to be investigated and explained, along with 
the creation of technical rules facilitating the development of abstract ideas within the legal system 
instead of relying on regulatory custom.17 And yet, beyond Maine’s disparagement of analytical 
approaches in the nineteenth century, modern legal theory has done little to engage with this sort 
of contextual muddle. David Ibbetson is in a minority in having actively done so, observing that 
Hartian ‘rules’ are problematic when you try to use them in historical contexts: it is difficult to 
identify rules of recognition with any certainty; non-rule based standards (which have important 
roles in reality) are marginalised by the model, which also does not engage with ‘background’ 
features; and there is an incorrect assumption that there is always an analytically correct answer to 
legal questions.18 Vinogradoff’s intention was to use historical jurisprudence in precisely this way 
in reforming and developing both future law and ideas about law, and this seems no less intelligent 
a proposition now than when he made it.19 
 
This article considers Vinogradoff’s unique version of historical jurisprudence in an 
attempt to explicitly draw out his contribution to legal theory as it has been, and possible future 
uses of his insights, in particular in the use of history and empirical data in refining and evaluating 
                                                        
16 M Lobban, ‘Introduction: the tools and the tasks of the legal historian’ in A Lewis and M  Lobban (eds) Law and History (2003) 6 Current 
Legal Issues 1, p 4.  
17 ibid, p 19. 
18 D Ibbetson, ‘What is legal history a history of?’ in Lewis and Lobban, above n 16, p 34. 
19 As Peter Stein argued in the 1980s: Legal Evolution: the story of an idea (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p 126 and in idem, ‘The Tasks 
of Historical Jurisprudence’ in N MacCormick and P Birks (eds) The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honoré (Clarendon Press 1986), p 304. 
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analytical models of law. First, I will consider the need for such a method in modern legal 
scholarship, and some of the challenges it might face. Second, I will discuss what Vinogradoff 
meant by historical jurisprudence. He believed that only by considering historical data and the 
contingent facts of human societies could any sort of accurate general propositions about law be 
formulated. This required the acknowledgement of gaps and flaws in legal doctrine, unlike 
analytical theories which rely on closed logical models. Third, I will consider to what extent this 
method did and did not derive from the work of Sir Henry Maine and the German historical school 
in order both to trace the intellectual history of the method, and to distinguish Vinogradoff’s 
unique contribution from his predecessors’. Finally, I will examine some of the challenges faced 
by historical jurisprudence then and now. I will argue that the loss, or at least the forgetting, of 
this method in Anglo-American jurisprudence has had negative consequences for both legal 
history and legal theory. Historical jurisprudence may be used to understand and evaluate legal 
doctrine, but also to assess and develop more contextualised legal theory, and as a model for how 
comparative and historical legal studies might be used together. I will not, however, seek to set out 
a comprehensive survey of all there is to say about historical jurisprudence past and present 
(although this would be valuable in reminding us all of the rich intellectual heritage of the ideas we 
now use), but to start a dialogue about method. Specifically, since there is so clearly a felt need for 
a methodology which engages law and history in a principled way, a dialogue which recognises and 
builds on Vinogradoff’s model for doing exactly that. As always when exploring the richness of 
law, there will be much, much more to say.  
 




In modern scholarship, a powerful call for a re-historicising of legal thinking developed out of 
the American Critical Legal Studies school in the late twentieth century.20 In the 1970s, the concept 
of historicism – that is, the idea that a ‘social practice or document is a product of the 
preoccupations of its own time and place’21 – brought a ‘corrective dose of professional historical 
method’ to legal theory which had been absent since Vinogradoff’s time.22 Robert Gordon 
especially has argued since the 1980s that this historicism, by demonstrating that the meanings of 
words and actions are to some degree (but not exclusively) dependent on the particular social and 
historical conditions in which they occur, and are to be interpreted and criticised as such, poses a 
perennial threat to conventional legal thinking. Gordon argues that legal scholars practice a range 
of strategies in order to avoid this threat, and that resort to such severely limits the intellectual 
options and imaginative range of that scholarship.23 In the nineteenth century, history was used to 
construct teleology or metaphysics, but Gordon uses it to tear down such structures in his 
‘antifoundational philosophy of history’: it is used to clear ground of structuralist tendencies – 
including the rival CLS work of Duncan Kennedy.24  
 
Historical jurisprudence suggests a model for responding to the threat historicism poses 
to legal thinking, by combining theoretical models with historical evidence in a two-step process. 
This is not necessarily a methodology Gordon himself would agree with, as it suggests a tendency 
to universalism and structuralism,25 and constitutes a form of ‘adaptation theory’, which Gordon 
finds unsatisfactory.26 Gordon’s critique of Kennedy is highly pertinent to Vinogradoff’s historical 
jurisprudence as he seems to fall into the same trap, namely in seeking stable categories (in 
                                                        
20 See above n 6. 
21 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1029. 
22 C Tomlins, ‘Historicism and Materiality in Legal Theory’ in Del Mar and Lobban (eds) above n 3, p 58. Tomlins is sceptical of the value of 
historicism and favours materiality as a standpoint from which to revise legal theory.  
23 C Tomlins, above n 22, p 61. 
24 Ibid p 61. In later work Kennedy moved away from structuralism. See also D Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought 1850-
2000’ in D M Trubek and A Santos (eds) The New Law And Economic Development (CUP 2006) p 19.  
25 Gordon, ‘The Past as Authority’, above n 6, p 305. 
26 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1028-1036. 
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Vinogradoff’s case, ‘types’ of law)27 behind the varied outcomes of specific and positively enacted 
rules. Gordon’s objection is that those positive rules are in fact all there is to law: whatever forms 
there may be are so actively created, repeated, and changed by every participant at every level of 
the legal system so often that those forms are descriptively meaningless.28 Nonetheless, historical 
jurisprudence is less exposed to the general objections of historicism than some attempts to use 
history in law: there is a problem in that either the past is inaccessible by virtue of the fact that it 
is impossible to reconstruct the mental stance of any historical point and the account is reduced 
to mere antiquarianism, or the historian must argue that an observer can indeed reconstruct the 
meaning for the participants of the time, which seems to assume some element of universalism 
which modern historicists deny.29 As will be demonstrated, Vinogradoff’s use of sociological types 
seems to bridge this gap, but only by using a structuralist type of account of the sort propounded  
in Kennedy’s early work. 
 
Whilst historical jurisprudence seeks to tackle the historicist threat head-on, what Gordon 
would call threat-avoidance strategies pose a significant barrier to its use in mainstream legal 
scholarship, notwithstanding the clear revival in interest and search for a methodology within 
which history and law can be brought profitably into dialogue from some corners. Legal positivism, 
the ahistorical analytical mode of thinking about law, makes claims to universal truths. But 
historical jurisprudence aspires to understanding the same fundamental principles only via ‘relative 
constructions’. This is not a lack of ambition – no one could fairly accuse Henry Maine of that - 
but as Maine demonstrated, a ‘general jurisprudence’ which attempted to reveal fundamental 
principles derived from the ‘universal requirements of the human mind’ was unhelpful in both 
analytical jurisprudence and historical approaches. A search for universals inherently involved 
                                                        
27 Discussed in section 3 below.  
28 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, 1023. 
29 Tomlins, above n 22, p 65.  
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‘cutting off arbitrarily parts of…development for the sake of unity of treatment’.30 And so, as 
Twining once observed, pluralism in this context is not ‘fence sitting’, but a commitment to the 
variety and richness of law.31  
 
This, of course, will not make it any more epistemologically satisfying for those who seek 
objective truths about law. Analytical jurisprudence in its modern form views questions such as 
‘what is law’ as unanswerable by reference to empirical data, requiring purely analytic engagement 
with the words used by participants in a legal system.32 Attempts to contextualise and criticism 
resulting therefrom are usually dismissed as beyond the scope of the philosophical enterprise. This 
‘linguistic turn’ in legal philosophy, with roots in the Benthamite analytical jurisprudence which 
always existed as a potent alternative to historical jurisprudence, far eclipsed other legal theories in 
the mid-twentieth century.33 Seen in the context of the difficulties historical jurisprudence 
presented for understanding legal change, the turn to positivism and language may be seen as a 
resolution of the problem of how to step from the individual to the universal by denying the 
existence of universal phenomena at all and instead focusing on the individual outcomes of legal 
rules as language games.34 Rather than abstracting from reality, as Maine sought to do, this legal 
philosophy abstracts from the abstract and denies empirical data any role. This resolves the 
timeless obstacle in deducing an ‘ought’ (law in future ought to be X) from an ‘is’ (law in the past 
has been Y).35 
 
This has led more than one legal philosopher to argue that, far from being a philosophy 
of law, historical jurisprudence is something else, since it does not seek to make universal claims 
                                                        
30 P Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, vol 1 (Oxford 1920-1922), pp 153-4.  
31 W Twining, ‘Evidence and Legal Theory’ in idem (ed) Legal Theory and Common Law (Blackwell 1986) p 64.  
32 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2012); J L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1962). 
33 Tamanaha, ‘The Third Pillar’, above n 4. 
34 Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (1954) 70 LQR 37; N MacCormick, ‘Hart: Moral Critic and Analytical Jurist’ in idem, H L A Hart 
(2nd edn 2008) p 17. 
35 G Samuel, ‘What is (or perhaps should be) the relationship between legal history and legal theory?’ (2018) 6(1) Comparative l egal history 
97, p 97; p 103. 
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about the nature of law.36 If the goal of jurisprudence is to establish analytical ideas about what 
law is as a precursor to being able to consider law in any context, legal positivism is logically prior 
to any other enquiry about the nature of law, historical or otherwise.37 But this is based on a 
particular conception of analytical ‘general jurisprudence’ as the way to find truths about law which 
must be universal and necessary.38 This is only one possible understanding of the enterprise, and 
– as historical jurisprudence demonstrates - an historically contingent one which can be contrasted 
with a number of other ways of thinking about law.39  
 
Nonetheless, many, perhaps most, theoreticians who have decided to approach law in an 
analytical way will not wish to contextualise their theories, as this would entail a departure from 
their basic premises. H L A Hart, for instance, appears to have thought it impossible to have both 
a general theory of law and an historical account showing the diversity of legal phenomena.40 This 
is entirely unobjectionable: a thicker approach to law has plenty of room to appreciate the valuable 
contribution of analytical jurisprudence alongside other approaches. Analytical jurisprudence 
offers one particular and sometimes very useful way of thinking about law, which historical 
jurisprudence can itself integrate and build upon by applying analytical models to the historical 
facts of different legal systems.41 In using Vinogradoff’s method in this way, it is possible to test 
the analytical models of law, to perhaps reveal their shortcomings, and to adapt them. 
 
                                                        
36 For core examples see J Raz, The Authority of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2009) 104; S J Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press 2011) 
406; J Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (OUP 2012). 
37 As expressed by H Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence’ (1941) 55 Harvard Law Review 44, pp 52 -53, and more 
recently by the late J Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith, and other essays on Law in General  (OUP 2012) 273-4. C.f. M Lobban, ‘Legal Theory and 
Legal History: Prospects for Dialogue’ in Del Mar and Lobban (eds) above n 3, p 4. 
38 For criticism of this narrowing of jurisprudence see R Cotterrell, ‘Why Jurisprudence is not Legal Philosophy’ (2014) 5 Juris prudence 41. 
39 See F Schauer, ‘The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism’ (2015) 101(4) Virginia Law Review 957 for a consideration of this relatively recent 
development in legal positivism; similarly M J Horwitz, ‘Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?’ (1997) 17 OJLS 551; G J Postema, 
‘Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science’ (2015) 101 Virginia L Rev 869. For an alternative view relating to the use of legal history, see M Del Mar, 
‘Beyond Universality and Particularity, Necessity and Contingency: On Collaboration Between Legal Theory and Legal History’ in Del Mar and 
Lobban (eds) above n 3, p 22. 
40 Hart, above n 32, pp 26-27; H L A Hart, ‘Review’ (1990) 105(416) The English Historical Review 700, p 701.  
41 This is exactly the dialogue proposed by Lobban, above n 37, p 7. 
 
 11 
Whilst this may well have little impact on analytical thinking, being derived from different 
premises, it does offer an alternative way of thinking about law and legal history – and, I would 
argue, a richer one. It can, for example, reveal lost facets of ideas which have fallen away purely 
because of path dependence – defined, broadly speaking, as the impact past decisions and 
experiences have on the development of ideas, with consequent ‘roads not taken’ - and not because 
of their inherent lack of merit.42 It can also test the usefulness of theories,43 and may show that the 
actual understanding held subjectively by legal system participants is different to the perspective 
claimed for them by the theory44 – one area in particular being the impact of practical concerns on 
legal developments, as opposed to the impact of the conceptual reasoning which analytical jurists 
focus on.45 Finally, whilst positivism chooses not to engage with empirical data, it nonetheless rests 
on a variety of assumptions about the real world, and if these assumptions are unsound it 
undermines the entire project from the outset.46 In this vein, Robert Gordon has argued that legal 
positivism applied to actual legal systems fails as soon as it is attempted to resolve actual social 
controversies: this cannot be achieved using a strictly internal logic based on an autonomous legal 
order (the doctrinal approach).47 History used in this way can provide counterfactuals to help break 
through the dogma and momentum that theory can accumulate. Theoretical models often try to 
freeze law in time in order to describe it, but putting a model to work in historical context shows 
that this cannot be done meaningfully in relation to law.48 It forces us to realise that there are many 
ways of thinking about law, and that different models used at different times will highlight different 
aspects.  
                                                        
42 P A David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75(2) The American economic review 332. Schauer, above n 39, takes precisely this 
approach in respect of legal positivism itself, see also the response paper by S Watt (2015) 101(4) Virginia Law Review 979. The use of critical 
legal history to do so as a method is indicated by Gordon, ‘The Past as Authority’, above n 6, 308. 
43 See Hutchinson, above n 8 on the need for useful jurisprudence.  
44 This is the legal philosophy bereft of ‘metaphysical baggage’ which Hutchinson enthusiastically calls for: ‘Casaubon’s Ghosts’, above n 8, p 
90. 
45 Lobban, ‘Dialogue’, above n 37, p 13. 
46 Cotterrell, above n 38, p 48. 
47 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1026.  
48 This argument is not new: see Del Mar, above n 39, p 25; S Collini, D Winch and J Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics (Cambridge University 
Press, 1983) describe the contemporaneous attempt to make use of ancient history as offering ‘laboratory studies’ for theories of politics in 




2. VINOGRADOFF’S HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The way different people and societies have thought about law at different times in 
Western history was the core of Vinogradoff’s historical jurisprudence. In the entry ‘Jurisprudence, 
Comparative’ in the 1911 edition of Encyclopædia Britannica,49 Vinogradoff reflected on his method. 
He described two kinds of comparative jurisprudence: one studied and compared different 
contemporary legal systems, the other considered how principles had developed within legal 
systems over time. ‘Historical jurisprudence’ was itself an aspect of comparative jurisprudence 
comparing across time, rather than across geographies. Early writers such as Coke, Selden, and 
Hale had implicitly used such a method in their exploration of the past history of a nation’s laws 
as normatively significant for present and future development.50 
 
A. A Science of Law and History 
 
Vinogradoff attempted both to develop a ‘scientific’ research method influenced by the 
German historical school and a legal theoretical approach. Maitland was correct that this would 
surprise readers at the time; even if it has gone unremarked more recently.51 It has been said that 
Vinogradoff widened Maitland’s horizons, and Maitland helped Vinogradoff to interpret English 
minds.52 Maitland was sceptical as to the appropriateness of combining history and philosophy,53 
and claimed to defer on social and economic questions to Vinogradoff because, to him, these 
                                                        
49 Encyclopædia Britannica, vol 15 (11th edn, CUP 1911), p 580. 
50 H J Berman, ‘The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale’ (1994) 100(7) Yale Law Journal 1651, p 1693.  
51 One scholar who did seem to agree with Vinogradoff’s approach was James Barr Ames, who similarly sought to test analysis of rules against 
historical facts, but Vinogradoff’s direct influence on American scholarship seems to have been forestalled by Pound’s denunc iation: Gordon, 
‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1041, citing J B Ames, ‘Two Theories of Consideration’, in idem, Lectures on Legal  History (1913) p 323; idem, ‘The 
Doctrine of Price v. Neal’, in idem, Lectures on Legal  History (1913) 270, p 284. 
52 A Levett and G O’Brien, ‘Obituary’ (1926) 36(142) The Economic Journal 310, p 311. Including helping Vinogradoff present his work in 
English: Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p x. 
53 R W Gordon, ‘J Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography’ (1975) 10 Law and Society Review 9,  p 17. 
 
 13 
questions were outside the proper remit of legal history.54 But Vinogradoff disagreed: to separate 
legal history from other aspects of social life was to miss the point. Maitland knew this - in a letter 
of 1889 he wrote to his friend:  
 
You ask me about the Preface [to Villainage in England] - well I think it grand work, and 
on the whole I think it will attract readers because of its very strangeness; but you will 
let me say that it will seem strange to English readers, this attempt to connect the 
development of historical study with the course of politics; and it leads you into what 
will be thought paradoxes.55  
 
Rather than generating paradoxes, combining the comparative method with precise 
historical research was intended to utilise the best of both methods and minimise their 
shortcomings. This combination enabled Vinogradoff to go beyond what German scholars had 
so far achieved by applying the German historical method to English materials.56 Contemporaries 
admired Maitland as ‘intensely cosmopolitan’ and attuned to what foreign historians were saying,57 
but Vinogradoff was particularly suited to synthesise: his ‘knowledge of the early history of 
England and English law was possessed by no continental historian or lawyer; and his knowledge 
of continental history and law was possessed by no English historian or lawyer.’58 Vinogradoff was 
the  ‘foreign critic’ with different training who could fill the ‘great opening’ in scholarship produced 
by the traditional isolation of English lawyers from continental knowledge.59 According to 
Vinogradoff’s student Holdsworth:  
                                                        
54 Letter from Frederic W Maitland to Reginald L Poole (15 July 1895) in H A L Fisher and F W Maitland, A Biographical Sketch (CUP 1910), p 
86. 
55 Letter from Frederic W Maitland to Paul Vinogradoff, in ibid, p 49. John W Burrow, ‘The Village Community and the Uses of History in Late 
Nineteenth-century England’ in Neil McKendrick (ed) Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of JH Plumb  
(London, 1974), p 257. 
56 Letter from Frederic W Maitland to Paul Vinogradoff (20 Feb 1889) in Fisher and Maitland, above n 54, p 49. 
57 Patrick Wormald, ‘Maitland and Anglo-Saxon Law: Beyond Domesday Book’ (1996) 89 Proceedings of the British Academy 1, p 8.  
58 W S Holdsworth and B Pares, ‘Sir Paul Vinogradoff’ (1926) 4(12) Slavonic Review 529, p 530. 
59 P N R Zutshi (ed) Letters of F W Maitland, vol 2 (1995) 11 Selden Society Supplemental p 129; Frederick W Maitland, ‘Why the History of 
English law is not written’, reprinted in H A L Fisher (ed), Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, Downing Professor of the Laws of 




[the introduction to Villainage in England] was especially valuable to his English 
readers, both because it brought the English writers and the English theories into 
line with continental writers and theories, and because it broadened their vision 
and let in new light upon insular controversies and insular estimates of their own 
writers.60  
 
Maitland also conceded, perhaps with reservations, that:  
 
…all that you say about Stubbs and Seebohm and Maine is, I dare say, very true if 
you regard them as European, not merely English, phenomena and attribute to 
them a widespread significance - and doubtless it is very well that Englishmen 
should see this - still looking at England only and our insular ways of thinking I 
see Stubbs and Maine as two pillars of conservatism, while as to Seebohm I think 
that his book is as utterly devoid of political importance… But you are 
cosmopolitan and I doubt not that you are right. You are putting things in a new 
light - that is all - if ‘the darkness comprehendeth it not’, that is the darkness's 
fault.61  
 
To illuminate the darkness using legal custom and precedent as the data from which principles 
which had developed over time might be extracted, and providing information as to how future 
developments might best be formulated, a principled approach was essential. It was not possible 
or desirable merely to collate information haphazardly. A principle, a rule, or an institution should 
                                                        
60 Holdsworth and Pares, above n 58, p 532. 
61 Letter from Frederic W Maitland to ‘a friend’ (12 March 1889) in Fisher and Maitland, A Biographical Sketch, above n 54, p 50. Despite this 
apparent praise, it was clear that Maitland generally disapproved of the comparative method, and any pursuit of general ‘laws of progress’ 
which could never be formulated: Frederic W Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond (Cambridge 1897) p 403.  
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be selected and traced, either through the direct systematisation of recorded facts, or through 
logical inferences when the recorded facts were inadequate in an attempt to discover general truths 
at the core of social life. Vinogradoff cited Mommsen, Jhering, and Kohler as examples of the 
method62 and it may be inferred that this is a summary of what he learned during his time studying 
in Germany as a young scholar.  
 
The failure to consider the role of borrowing of concepts63 had emerged as a further 
missing element which historical jurisprudence needed to embrace.64 Vinogradoff emphasised that 
phenomena which seemed similar but appeared in very different contexts were not necessarily 
derived from identical or universal causes.65 It was necessary to consider whether multiple factors 
might have led to a development, and whether a borrowing from one society to another was likely, 
given their level of connectedness. Sometimes, outcomes might just reflect similar solutions to 
similar problems, and it was these examples which might reveal fundamental similarities or timeless 
truths amongst different cultures.66  
 
B. ‘External’ legal history  
 
It is harder to demonstrate the lasting value of Vinogradoff’s work as a legal theorist than 
as an historian, even though he himself believed that legal history and legal theory should be 
intimately connected. A key aspect of this was that the examination of history swiftly demonstrated 
the insufficiency of purely analytic theories of law, with the narrow definitions and assumptions 
                                                        
62 Paul Vinogradoff, The Growth of the Manor (2 edn, George Allen & Company Ltd 1911), p 587. 
63 Nowadays there is a rich literature on ‘legal transplants’, eg A Watson, Legal Transplants: an Approach to Comparative Law  (University of 
Georgia Press, 1993); W Ewald ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43 Am J Comp L 489; D Nelken, 'Legal 
Transplants and beyond: of disciplines and metaphors' in A Harding and E Örücü (eds.), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (London: Kluwer, 
2002). 
64 K Mantena, Alibis of Empire (Princeton 2010), p 85. Maine briefly engaged with the idea in relation to India: Henry Maine, Dissertations on 
early Law and Custom (London 1883), p 45. 
65 Stein, Legal Evolution, above n 19, p 104 cites this as a criticism of Maine without apparently noticing that Vinogradoff sought to address it.  
66 Encyclopædia Britannica, above n 49, p 585. 
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of analytic philosophy constantly challenged by historical jurisprudence. Vinogradoff’s method 
offered a different kind of insight into the nature of law by ‘grounding’ analytic and other legal 
theories in historical context. This contextual layer provided the potential to consider changing 
ideas about law over time rather than a static conception of law at any one point.  
 
 His personal archive demonstrates that Vinogradoff was an avid reader of The Times case 
reports, keeping many cuttings on matters of professional67 and general interest.68 He was clearly 
able to read, analyse, and use legal cases in his arguments and in his teaching, notwithstanding his 
lack of formal training or practice as a lawyer. It was not an absence of competence with legal 
materials which led his scepticism about doctrinal lawyers’ conventional approach to law as a 
rational and closed system – what Hart would later refer to as the internal point of view.69 The 
problem was that law formed a ‘crust’ over the reality of social facts, as ‘both an influence and a 
consequence’ which inevitably gave ‘a very definite even if a somewhat distorted shape to the social 
processes which come within its sphere of action’.70  
 
The moments where doctrine was most unsound were those where social life was most 
visible: ‘there is no law, however subtle and comprehensive, which does not exhibit on its logical 
surface seams and scars, testifying to the incomplete fusing together of doctrines that cannot be 
brought under the cover of one principle’.71 This was a very different perspective to those who 
favoured the ‘internal’ study of legal doctrine: Vinogradoff was wary of oversimplification of 
complex facts in order to construct logically coherent principles. Complexity and contradiction 
provide ‘insight into the historical stratification of ideas and facts, a stratification which cannot be 
                                                        
67 Vinogradoff was active in trade union disputes with miners in the 1920s so cuttings include, for instance, Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants v Osborne [1910] AC 87. 
68 Heddon v Evans (1919) 35 TLR 642, concerning the rights of soldiers, for example. 
69 Hart, Concept of Law, above n 32.  
70 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 127.  
71 ibid, p 127. It is interesting to note that the question of whether legal principles do in fact succumb and fail to deal with certain complex 




abolished however much lawyers crave for unity and logic.’72 Maine had already begun to explain 
how modern legal systems utilised fictions, equity, and legislation to close the inevitable gap that 
opened when social norms changed more swiftly than the law,73 and Vinogradoff advocated the 
study of those gaps.74 These doctrinal scars showed how law had developed: 
 
…the legal intellect is by its calling and nature always engaged in analysing complex 
cases into constitutive elements, and bringing these elements under the direction 
of principles. It is constantly struggling with the confusing variety of life, and from 
the historian’s point of view it is most interesting when it succumbs in the 
struggle.75  
 
Vinogradoff put theory into practice in his historical works, for example when considering the 
medieval English treatise writer Bracton’s use of Roman law,76 or the complexity of the legal status 
of medieval villainage.77 He considered exactly the moments of poor fit or illogic to explain how 
and why law changed.78 When this approach was applied more broadly to concepts of law in 
general it showed that ‘there was no one history of human jurisprudence. There were in fact several 
histories.’79  
 
Vinogradoff’s perspective included other branches of the ‘human sciences’, with 
notebooks full of material on psychology, philosophy, politics, and economics in a variety of 
                                                        
72 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 128.  
73 Henry Maine, Ancient law: its connection with the early history of society and its relation to modern ideas  (J Murray 1906) p xvii. In more 
recent scholarship, it resembles Brian Simpson’s model of English common law as a customary law system: Brian Simpson, ‘The Common Law 
and Legal Theory’ in Twining (ed), above n 31, p 8.   
74 This is, in fact, comparative jurisprudence in one sense and was consistent with Maine’s interest in the gaps between social ideas and law 
– see Vinogradoff’s definition in the Encyclopædia Britannica, above n 49; Mantena, above n 64, p 107. 
75 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 127.  
76  Vinogradoff, ‘The Roman Elements in Bracton’s Treatise’ (1923) reprinted in Collected Papers, vol 1, above n 163, p 237. 
77 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 223. For the idea that politics, law, and agriculture were all interlinked in historical jurisprudence 
generally, see Stein, ‘The Tasks’, above n 19, who traces it from Montesquieu via Adam Smith. 
78 In the twentieth century, Ronald Dworkin would deploy the same tactic as a critique of Hart: Taking Rights Seriously (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013), p 105. 
79 Fisher, ‘A memoir’ above n 163, p 50. 
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languages. He was unwilling to sacrifice any detail for the sake of simplicity – in what might now 
be referred to as ‘external legal history’.80  In his own words: ‘instead of seeking for the 
philosopher’s stone in the shape of a single theory of law, we had better attend for the present to 
five or six theories of law derived from different social premises.’81 But this makes the purview of 
legal history wide, and requires either a great deal of knowledge vested in one person, or extensive 
collaboration between fields. Whilst the stringent need for evidence based history to compare from 
might entail more work than is practical for one scholar alone, and in turn also help to explain the 
decline of popularity of the method, it means that in modern legal scholarship there is great 
potential for comparative lawyers and legal historians to make use of Vinogradoff’s methodology.82 
 
Vinogradoff asked how, precisely, apparently similar processes and institutions had 
developed in different contexts – an ‘ideological approach’ more similar to Pound’s ‘sociological 
jurisprudence’ or Weber’s sociology than any legal evolutionary model. Tamanaha has argued that 
by the 1920s Vinogradoff’s work was sociological (rather than historical) notwithstanding that the 
label was not applied to it.83 Social scientists like Weber and Coase have had little impact on 
mainstream legal historical scholarship, especially in Britain, where the focus tends to be on 
doctrinal models and reconstructing intellectual processes, rather than ‘external’ explanatory 
models.84 One difficulty with using such social scientists’ models is that they tend to fail to account 
for change and timing, and the impact of path dependence.85 Vinogradoff was aware of this, but 
nonetheless deployed the ideal of legal types as the basis for his theory of law. He thought that 
ideas about law were more likely to be consistent across time and place than substantive legal rules, 
                                                        
80 Gordon, ‘J Willard Hurst’ above n 53, p 11. 
81 P Vinogradoff, ‘The Study of Jurisprudence’ in Collected Papers above n 160, vol 2, p 205.  
82 The Online Symposium on the European Legal History Society's Journal Comparative Legal History held on 10 June 2020 largely centred on 
the need for such methodology. A similar process of collaboration within a general framework established by a former wave of scholarship 
occurred in sociology of law between sociologists and lawyers in the 1960s: P Selznick, ‘The Sociology of Law’ in R Merton, L Room and L 
Cottrell (eds) Sociology Today (1959). 
83 B Tamanaha, ‘The Unrecognised Triumph of Historical Jurisprudence’ (2013) 91 Texas L Rev 615, p 628. 
84 J Getzler, ‘Law, History, and the Social Sciences: Intellectual Traditions of Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-century Europe’ in Lewis and 
Lobban, above n 16, p 224. 
85 Getzler, ibid, p 223. See further above n 42. 
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since all systems of law had to deal with certain issues, like rules, rights, public and private law, 
crime and punishment, status and contract. Considering the history of these modes of legal 
thought (the internal point of view) was likely to reveal the closest thing to universal principles 
which was possible and these formed the basis of his legal ‘types’.  This required the expansion of 
historical knowledge and the comparative method to illustrate the relative successes and failures 
of different approaches to social and legal problems. By combining this with analytic models which 
represented the ‘dialectical reasoning’ and internal logic of the law, a new jurisprudence could be 
produced.86   
 
His turn to theoretical questions was tempered by the fact that ‘he did not think that the 
time had come, and doubted whether it would ever come, when it would be feasible to show the 
continuous growth of jurisprudence upon the planet in a single picture.’87 He nonetheless began 
an attempt,88 as an ‘outline’ to be further developed by future scholars.89 Even then, what was 
outlined was not ‘a’ theory of law, but several model types drawing on different historical contexts90 
– one of which was based on analytical jurisprudence: 
 
its solid achievements consist in the analysis of certain formal conceptions of positive law. 
It helps to explain the working of the machinery by which the legislative power puts the 
rules decreed by it into operation by means of courts of law and of the police. It does not 
solve the problems of the origin of legal rules and of their relation to the life of society.91 
 
                                                        
86 Vinogradoff, ‘The Study of Jurisprudence’, above n 81, p 214.  
87 Fisher, ‘A memoir’ above n 163, p 49.  
88 Vinogradoff, Outlines, above n 30. 
89 Fisher, ‘A memoir’ above n 163, p 47.  
90 The types were the totemistic, the tribal, the ancient city state, the medieval system of feudalism and canon law, and modern industrial 
society. 
91 Vinogradoff, Outlines, above n 30, p 123; p 157. For a more recent conceptualisation of legal positivism as an ideal type see F Pirie, ‘Legal 
Theory and Legal History: A View from Anthropology’ in Del Mar and Lobban (eds) above n 3, p 39. 
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Late in life, Vinogradoff focused on ‘the application of historical tests [to show the weaknesses of] 
analytical jurists and of those philosophers who looked to a social compact as the origin of 
society’92 – an essentially historicist position in contrast to Maine’s universalist aspirations.93 
Vinogradoff believed that legal positivism was ‘incomplete and barren’, too state-centric and 
dismissive of any legal system not directly linked to state power.94 This was true of analytic models 
in both law and history: Fustel de Coulanges’ attempt to use an analytic method of history proved 
this.95 It should have been clear after Savigny had demonstrated the role of tradition and 
‘unconscious organic growth’ that any ‘utopian doctrines of political rationalism’ were imperfect.96  
 
Vinogradoff recognised the difficulty here: he knew that model types were artificially static 
and did not recognise that ideas themselves were ‘mobile entities’ which passed through stages of 
their own, from ‘indistinct beginnings, gradual differentiation, struggles and compromises, growth 
and decay’. This was an inevitable limitation, and could only be countered by combining work 
from both sides of the problem – bringing together static and dynamic portraits.97 The method 
therefore ‘runs out’ at this point, but explicitly setting this problem out was undoubtedly a key 
development. He explicitly acknowledged that legal change was a phenomenon in need of 
explanation, but was confident that another scholar would address this point to fill in the gaps of 
his attempted outline.98 And yet, even a hundred years later, whilst legal historians often say that 
law changed to meet social needs, Gordon found they rarely attempt to state what these social 
needs were, how they originated, or how they changed over time.99 In contrast, the notion that 
                                                        
92 Fisher, ‘A memoir’ above n 163, p 32. 
93 B Tamanaha, ‘How History Bears on Jurisprudence’ in Del Mar and Lobban (eds) above n 3, 329, 334. 
94 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 1.  
95 P Vinogradoff, Russian thought (January 1980), reproduced in A Meyendorff (trans), ‘Sir Paul Vinogradoff: A Bibliographical Appreciation’ 
(1926) 5 Slavonic Review 157, p 158.  
96 F K von Savigny, On the Vocation of Our Age; H Kantorowicz, ‘Savigny and the Historical School of Law’ (1937) 53 LQR 326; Vinogradoff, 
Villainage, above n 1, p 10. 
97 Vinogradoff, Outlines, above n 30, p 160.  
98 ibid, p 160.  
99 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1029-1030. 
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types of legal thinking are associated with types of society has been so successful it is now 
commonplace.100 
 
3. DEEP ROOTS: MAINE AND THE GERMAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL 
 
Vinogradoff’s refinements of historical jurisprudence rested on the original model conceived 
by Sir Henry Maine. If Vinogradoff is to be rehabilitated, his relationship with Maine should be 
made explicit, for two reasons. Firstly, because any enterprise seeking to reveal the intellectual 
roots of historical jurisprudence needs to do so: Maine is credited as having founded the English 
branch of the school which compared legal developments across time and place,101 giving English 
jurisprudence an independent identity separate from legal practice and utilitarian theory.102 But 
Maine had limited interest in developing or describing a precise methodology,103 often presenting 
generalisations ‘as if by inspiration’104 and rarely engaging with his critics. The second reason, then, 
for making explicit the connections between Maine and Vinogradoff is to disassociate the latter, 
where appropriate, from some of the more obviously problematic aspects of the work of the 
former.  
 
A. Maine’s Methodology 
 
In the closest Maine came to describing his methodology, he envisioned the investigation of 
the history and principles of law by comparing communities both historically and 
                                                        
100 Gordon, ‘Past as Authority’, above n 6, p 287. 
101 Collini, Winch and Burrow doubt whether the comparative approach was really novel in the 1860s rather than a consistent feature of 
‘whiggish’ approaches to history, but it is certainly the case that this was the period and the author who popularised the comparative and 
historical jurisprudence;  above n 48, p 185. 
102 Cocks, Maine, above n 14, p 77. 
103 Ibid, p 149; idem, ‘Sir Henry Maine: 1822-1888’ (1988) 8(3) Legal Studies 247, p 252. 
104 M E Grant Duff, Sir Henry Maine: a brief memoir of his life (New York: Henry Holt and Co 1892) p 80; ‘Obituary: Sir Henry Maine’, 11 
February 1888 Saturday Review, p 150. 
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philosophically.105 Simple comparison took the legal systems of two distinct societies to compare 
their overall approach to a single topic without regard to history, but comparative jurisprudence 
was something more. Maine was inspired by106 comparative philology and mythology’s 
investigation of temporal relationships between ‘parallel’ phenomena and he wanted to compare 
not just across space but across time.  
 
His method had some commonalities with,107 but differed from, the approach of the German 
historical school, which may or may not have directly influenced him.108 Maine’s approach lacked 
the specificity and attention to detail epitomised by the German school:  
 
When one passes from a survey of English historiography to German 
historiography, one is at once struck by a difference both in methods and 
purpose… The place of a general narrative is taken by research work, the place of 
broad problems by special topics.109  
 
But unlike the German school, Maine’s approach was comparative as well as historical, and it was 
not constrained by a concept of semi-sacred national tradition.110 The German school had its own 
flaws: historical investigation tended to progress from the focal point of political institutions or 
general culture and external growth, whilst ignoring agricultural (economic) facts, class, and legal 
organisation.111 It could be a deeply nationalist viewpoint which was dismissive of other cultures 
                                                        
105 H Maine, Village Communities in the East and West: Six Lectures Delivered at Oxford with other lectures, addresses and essays  (1st edn 
1871; New York: Henry Holt and Co 1889), p 6. 
106 Mantena described comparative philology as an ‘inspirational analogy’ rather than a methodological model: Mantena, above n 64, p 74.  
107 In any case the lack of a recognised Mainian school makes it temptingly easy to align him with the German school when categorising: Cocks, 
Maine, above n 103, p 248. 
108 The school is thought of as founded by Frederick Charles von Savigny, whose views can primarily be found in Of the Vocation of Our Age 
for Legislation and Jurisprudence (Abraham Hayward trans, London: Littlewood, 1831). It is questionable how far Maine engaged with the 
substantive arguments of the German scholars: see Cocks, Maine, above n 14, p 24-27. It has been argued that Maine was nodding to a shared 
intellectual culture rather than to the substance of the German scholars’ works: Cosgrove, above n 9, p 126; and alternatively that he was 
heavily influenced by Niebuhr: N O’Brien, ‘’Something older than law itself’: Sir Henry Maine, Niebuhr, and ‘the path not chosen’’ (2005) 26(3) 
JLH 229; or by both Niebuhr and Savigny: Mantena, above n 64, p 65; p 100. 
109 P Vinogradoff, The Journal of the Ministry of Education (Russian, December 1883), reproduced in Meyendorff, above n 95, p 164.  
110 P Vinogradoff, ‘The Teaching of Sir Henry Maine’ (1904) 20 LQR 119, reprinted in Collected Papers, vol 1, above n 163, p 173; p 180.  
111 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 25.  
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and the knowledge to be gained from their study, and hence was not open to insights from the 
comparative method.112 In fact, influential as it was, Vinogradoff thought the German approach 
was rapidly ‘antiquated’ because of its narrowness in being both unable to approach issues 
comparatively and unable to account for conscious growth.113 Maine114 and Jhering115 respectively 
had sought to address these issues, demonstrating that the German historical method alone was 
insufficient.  
 
This is useful, but falls something short of a full methodology: Maine was generally content to 
describe the history of a system or theory, and leave it to others to test the accuracy of both his 
claims and his method.116 In many ways, Maine’s interests were practical, not theoretical: he was 
concerned with the effective governance of India;117 Irish land law; 118 and the reform of legal 
training and education.119 This may help explain his lack of abstract methodology: rather, his work 
should be seen through the ‘lens of his preoccupations’.120 Less generously, contemporaries 
described Maine as ‘hasty’121 or even lazy,122 producing ‘odd results’ with ‘lapses in detail’123 – 
perhaps then, he simply did not want to do the work involved.  
 
By the time Vinogradoff was appointed to Maine’s former Oxford chair,124 criticisms of 
Maine had accumulated. Vinogradoff launched a defence of Maine in his inaugural lecture: his 
predecessor had not aimed to produce minute research with precision and fine attention to detail, 
                                                        
112 Vinogradoff, ‘Teaching’ above n 110, p 181. 
113 Vinogradoff, Outlines, above n 30, p 135. 
114 H Maine, The Effects of Observation of India on Modern European Thought: The Rede Lecture 1875 (London 1875) p 23.  
115 R von Jhering, The Struggle for Law (J Lalor trans, Chicago, 1915). 
116 J F Stephen, (1861) 114 Edinburgh Rev 456, p 482. 
117 Maine was particularly influential in the adoption of a policy of ‘indirect rule’: see generally Mantena, above n 64. 
118 Burrow, above n 55, p 256; Clive Dewey, ‘Celtic Agrarian Legislation and the Celtic Revival: Historicist Implications of Gladstone's Irish and 
Scottish Land Acts 1870-1886’ (1974) 64 Past & Present 30. 
119 Peter Stein, ‘Maine and legal education’ in Alan Diamond, The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine  (2006), p 195. 
120 Cocks, Maine, above n 14, pp 52-53. 
121 Duff, above n 104, p 7; p 80. 
122 Cocks, Maine, above n 14, p 250 per James Fitzjames Stephen; G Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography of Sir Henry Maine 1822–
1888 (New York: Humanities Press 1969) p 174; p 245. 
123 Sir Frederick Pollock to Frederick Maitland, 28 Dec 1900; 26 Oct 1902, Frederick Maitland Papers, Cambridge University Library; see further 
Cosgrove, above n 9, p 142. 
124 Brian Simpson, ‘The Corpus Chair and Oxford Jurisprudence as Evolved by 1952’ in idem, Reflections on ‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 17. 
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but had tried to delineate the broad aspects of an emerging subject area:125 a sketch, not a detailed 
survey.126  ‘Cheap criticisms’ of Maine based on his lack of precision judged him by a standard 
which he had never aspired to,127 and failed to consider his success as a ‘force in European 
thought’. Maine’s achievement had been in connecting German historical research with Victorian 
ideas about the scientific method and universal laws,128 and the impact of his work is demonstrated, 
inter alia, by the tendency to associate him with Darwin.129 Vinogradoff knew that Maine had been 
biased towards one version of history, and that he had used a confusing array of sources and  
neglected facts which might have contradicted or disordered his narrative.130 However, he argued 
it was possible to take the best parts of Maine’s method and move beyond his limitations and 
biases.131 
 
The flaws inherent in Maine’s method were obvious, even to him.132 He was using the new 
‘scientific’ method to search for ‘laws of development’ and broad generalisations.133 Bias and 
careless assumptions of comparability could easily arise, and expressly seeking an even-handed 
selection of materials represented something of an innovation. Nineteenth century historical 
writing had only recently metamorphosed  from a narrative, literary activity into a type of reasoned 
                                                        
125 Vinogradoff, ‘Teaching’ above n 110, p 174; pp 183-185.  
126 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, 28. More recently the same point has been made by Rodney Hilton, ‘The Content and Sources of English 
Agrarian History before 1500’ (1955) 3(1) The Agricultural History Review 3, p 4.  
127 Criticism of a writer for failing to come up with an idea which they are, in retrospect, required to develop is precisely the phenomenon 
Quentin Skinner referred to as part of the ‘mythology of doctrine’ in ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ in Quentin Skinner, 
Visions of Politics (CUP 2002) p 67. Pollock had made this point about Maine as early as 1888: (1888) Edin Rev 1, p 6.  
128 Stein, Legal Evolution, above n 19, p 90. 
129 Henry Maine, Dissertations on early Law and Custom (London 1883) p 361; ‘Obituary: Sir Henry Maine’ in Humphrey Ward (ed) Eminent 
Persons: Biographies Reprinted from the Times, vol 4, 1887-1890 (London MacMillan 1893) p 25; Feaver, above n 122, p 43. It is doubtful how 
familiar Maine was with the substance Darwin’s ideas, or how committed Maine or even Vinogradoff really were to the idea of ‘science’ in 
history – the association is by virtue of impact, not substance: Feaver, above n 122, p 44; Kenneth E Bock, ‘Comparison of Histories: The 
Contribution of Henry Maine’ (1974) 16(2) Comparative Studies in Society and History 232, p 236; Krishan Kumar, ‘Maine and the Theory of 
Progress’ in Diamond (ed), above n 119, p 78. 
130 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, pp 29-30. 
131 Vinogradoff, above n 110, p 189. See also Cocks, Maine, above n 14, p 150. This developmental arc from grand theory to method is not 
dissimilar to Selznick’s description of the development of sociology, to which historical jurisprudence was related, most notably via Weber. 
Arguably historical jurisprudence is only now reaching the third and final stage of ‘intellectual maturity’: Selznick, above n 82, p 115. 
132 Maine, Village Communities, above n 105, p 7. 
133 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p vi. Amusingly, Vinogradoff foresaw that the history of the nineteenth century would include an 
‘important and attractive’ chapter on the development of historical writing: ibid, p 1. For a summary of the difficulties encountered by early 
legal science see M D A Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 8th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), p 6-8. 
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knowledge which used past events to understand social life.134 Writers like Blackstone135 may well 
have deployed history in a distorted fashion to evidence a preferred theory, as Vinogradoff 
accused,136 but doing otherwise may not have even occurred to them. Even in Vinogradoff’s time, 
his friend and contemporary Seebohm was criticised for using only one type of source, selecting 
only facts which supported his views,137 and relying on forged documents.138 But this ‘vulgar mode’ 
of historical study was accessible and impactful, so it remained popular.139  
 
Maine had generalised too readily, but his objections to abstraction had cleared the 
ground140 by demonstrating that Bentham and Austin’s analytical jurisprudence was unsatisfactory 
as a complete legal theory.141 Their abstraction, and the necessity of excluding from consideration 
at least some of the many complex elements of politics, religion, custom, tradition, and imitation 
that went into legal thought made it impossible to use analytical jurisprudence to understand 
phenomena in the real world.142 Maine used Indian customary law very successfully to show that 
analytical jurisprudence simply could not cope when confronted with law which was not command 
based.143 The empirical and contextualised method that Maine advocated -  even if he often fell 
short of his own standard – was a useful and a valid way to build legal theory.144 
 
Vinogradoff set out develop this and to give English historical jurisprudence a clear 
methodology145 based on a rigorous evidence-based approach to the sorts of questions which 
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Maine had often raised but not examined in detail.146 Maine had used few English historical 
materials and preferred to draw examples from the more ‘scientific’ Roman law in exploring 
proposed legal universals.147 But the late nineteenth century ‘archival revolution’, wherein scholars 
like Vinogradoff and Maitland closely investigated historical primary sources, enabled a sort of 
research based history which would have been practically difficult to achieve in Maine’s time. 
Vinogradoff engaged in the close study of English history in both published and unpublished 
records, and substantiated his claims in detail rather than making the broad generalisations Maine 
was famous for.148 Dewey has argued that Maine’s approach allowed English scholars to be free 
of reliance on greater German technical competence and to effectively develop their own data set 
using the comparative method - in Maine’s case focusing on India - instead of having to work 
exclusively on fragmentary medieval documents.149 The spree of publication and editing of primary 
sources at the end of the century150 enabled not just the construction of evidence based claims in 
general, but the falsification of generalisations: with the detailed evidence more available and 
accessible, it became harder to defend sweeping claims. 
 
Maine had also emphasised the use of comparison to help fill gaps in knowledge or 
historical evidence, comparing across both time and space. Using both types of comparison 
enabled illustration of the development of legal doctrines, and the comparison of similar processes 
and institutions to extend from specific examples to general conclusions without departing from 
the scientific commitment to evidence-based claims.151 The resort to comparison was also in part 
to remedy the gaps in historical evidence, as any strictly local approach would inevitably be full of 
unknowns. Maine had realised that in order to fill these gaps, evidence from ‘kindred processes’ 
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could be used.152 If Dewey is correct that Maine’s expansive comparative method was in part a 
response to the inability of English scholarship to compete with German research,153 Vinogradoff’s 
version narrowed the scope of the method again by requiring that comparison be used as well as, 
not instead of, technical historical research. To Vinogradoff, comparison was suggestive rather than 
conclusive, but he agreed that it could help evidence the possibilities where there were breaks in 
recorded history.154 If the inference was not supported by evidence, or the evidence could go either 
way, he generally said so – but because Vinogradoff knew more about continental social history 
than most, if not all, of his English contemporaries he was able to more confidently and accurately 
make those comparisons.155 Since Vinogradoff also taught English scholars how to engage in 
precise historical research through his seminars at Oxford, it was in him that the two schools fully 
met.156 
 
B. Stages and Types 
 
Whilst it was no longer true that historical research comprised of ‘two extremes of minute 
research leading to no general results and general statements not based on any real investigation 
into facts’,157 the new approach was still developing and required refinement, with more stringent 
standards of criticism and more ‘exact’ methods.158 The building of ‘dogmatic doctrine on the 
foundation of abstract principle and by deductive methods’ ought to give way to ‘an exact study 
of facts in their historical surroundings, and to inquiries into the shifting conditions under which 
the problems of social economy and law are solved by different epochs’.159 This was an approach 
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derived from the scientific method, and modelled on the German historical school with its 
powerful reputation for meticulousness, but newly adapted for English scholarship. A key first 
step for Vinogradoff was to avoid the one-sided examination of historical facts and ‘uncritical 
accumulation’ which discredited the method and led to criticisms of Maine.160 Rather than 
postulating a framework like ‘status to contract’ and searching for details in history, Vinogradoff 
sought to proceed from details outwards, constructing theory built on evidence of local life.161 
 
Vinogradoff was also unenthusiastic about searching for universal laws – contrary to the 
trend of his time to search for the laws of ‘legal evolution’.162 Unsurprisingly, given his personal 
history,163 he had a distaste for Marxism’s over-simplification of social life into economic factors 
at the cost of treating all other aspects as subordinate.164  Any analyses which linked economic 
stages with ‘necessary’ institutional features (as opposed to commonly occurring ones) was 
problematic. For example, the domination of agricultural labourers by a ruling class was a recurring 
feature in different places, with different cultures. But it did not follow that particular ways of life 
were necessitated by this, as Frederic Seebohm had argued.165 Even within England, inheritance 
customs which seemingly had completely opposite aims existed side by side in medieval 
communities with near identical economic and lordship conditions. This helped to disprove the 
idea that a given economic condition would strictly determine all the legal customs and social 
structures in a society. But it was possible to find patterns of common features without being 
deterministic about them.166 The fact that the inheritance custom of Borough English was 
                                                        
160 Vinogradoff, ‘The Study of Jurisprudence’ above n 81, p 208. 
161 Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 12; Palgrave, History of the English Commonwealth (Murray 1832); Palgrave, Normandy and England 
(London: Macmillan 1840). How possible it is to approach materials in a value-free way has since been considered in depth by Skinner, above  
n 127. 
162 See generally Stein, Legal Evolution, above n 19. 
163 Vinogradoff was forced out of Russia in 1903 for being too liberal, and although he continued to return regularly for many years after, 1917 
decisively severed his ties with the country and precipitated an application for British citizenship: H A L Fisher , ‘A Memoir’ in idem (ed) The 
Collected Papers of Sir Paul Vinogradoff, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), p 59. 
164 ibid, p 67; Vinogradoff, Villainage, above n 1, p 31.  
165 Maxime Kovalevsky had made the same point in relation specifically to Seebohm’s work: ‘The Origin and Growth of Village Communities in 
Russia’ (1888) 1(4) The Archaeological Review 266.  
166 Encyclopædia Britannica, above n 49, p 586.  
 
 29 
common amongst the medieval unfree was part of why it came to be associated with tests of 
unfreedom: whilst it was not a requirement that the unfree had this custom, it was commonly true 
that they did, and discovering if this was caused by a preference or lordship pressures (or both) 
revealed something of medieval ideas and ways of living even if it did not reveal any universal laws.  
 
Maine’s historical jurisprudence was accused of being predicated on false necessary 
chronological stages of history – a ‘Whiggish history writ large’ in the words of a modern 
commentator.167 It is a debated question how evolutionary Maine’s historical jurisprudence was,168 
but he claimed at least some ‘primitive’ societies became ‘progressive’, and that the features 
involved in this transition in ‘Aryan’ societies could be identified and described.169 However, even 
Maine recognised that ‘static’ societies did not necessarily or deterministically evolve into 
‘progressive’ ones,170 and that not all societies would exhibit all features in the same way. He 
recognised the possibility of different lines of progress, but his particular outline was presented as 
the story of how one type of ‘primitive’ or static society had in fact become ‘progressive’ in Western 
Europe.171  
 
When Vinogradoff built on Maine’s work, he attempted to develop from this line of 
thinking a theory of social change and how it related to legal change. This was arguably sociological 
rather than strictly legal or historical: Gordon described the attempt as ‘comparative history of 
sociology’ which bridged the gulf between dogmatic legal thinking and the requirements of the 
historical method.172 As other influential thinkers like Spencer and Durkheim had found, it was 
difficult to go beyond description and to explain change over time. Maine’s use of an idea of 
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evolution may have been an attempt to engage with the problem of how one type of society 
changes into another over time,173 but Maine never attempted to explicitly explain legal change.174 
It is arguable, given the challenges in theorising such a topic, that his idea of progress, defined as 
being able to adapt and to stay adaptable, was sufficient for his purposes.175  
 
Vinogradoff was the only one who tried to systematically relate Maine’s theoretical ideas 
to progress and change concepts,176 and Cocks described Vinogradoff’s reward for loyalty to Maine 
as ‘intellectual isolation’.177 This is very true of his Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence.178 The work was 
not complete on his death, and is not now well know or used – perhaps because it is guilty of many 
of the same unfounded generalisations as Maine’s work: Brian Simpson described it as ‘largely and 
deservedly forgotten’.179 As with Maine, a chronological scheme of stages is presented without 
resolving the problem of change.180 In fact, it may be a worse problem for Vinogradoff: there is a 
taxonomy at the broadest level of recognising Weberian social types, but not even a Whiggish 
progression to tie it together.181  
 
Nonetheless, Vinogradoff’s method did not, as Roscoe Pound claimed, break with Maine’s 
‘historical jurisprudence’ in favour of fact-based ‘legal history’:182 Vinogradoff argued that the latter 
was an essential foundation for the former. Maine’s claim to depart from the narrative history 
which characterised the writings of Freeman or Stubbs bared him to a new kind of criticism which 
he was not prepared to meet: the historicist one. Narrative history was not susceptible to historicist 
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criticism because it was not evidence-based, but Whiggish ideas of progress which claimed to be 
based on history were exposed to exactly this,183 as Seebohm swiftly demonstrated with his 
Romanist response to Maine.184 
 
4. THE DECLINE OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Historical jurisprudence offered an opportunity to free law from the ‘merely dogmatic’ or 
strictly technical approach:185 Vinogradoff’s method offered a framework for combining social 
theory, history, and analytic models of law. But it has been forgotten by modern jurisprudence. In 
one particularly depressing analysis:  
 
The historical jurisprudence to which Vinogradoff aspired – a discipline which would bring 
history, psychology and the social sciences into dialogue with philosophical analysis of law 
– stands, a century after its conception, as little more than a footnote in contemporary 
study of the history of jurisprudential ideas (and as yet less than that in conventional 
jurisprudential study).186 
 
Rodney Hilton, an historian, once said that scholars tend to use both Vinogradoff and Marc Bloch 
as a source of illustrative material rather than as theorists in their own right.187 Bloch’s comparative 
method for social history was strikingly similar to Vinogradoff’s, and also sought to describe 
patterns, avoiding sociological determinism and generalisation, but utilising comparison of minute 
local history with parallels elsewhere, or from a different time.188 Like Vinogradoff, he believed 
                                                        
183 J W Burrow, A Liberal Descent (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p 20 briefly considers this point.  
184 Frederic Seebohm, The English Village Community (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1883). 
185 Lobban, above n 16, p 19. 
186 Lacey, above n 15. 
187 R Hilton, The English Peasantry in the later Middle Ages: The Ford lectures for 1973 and related studies  (Oxford: Clarendon 1975) p 4. 
188 Getzler, ‘Intellectual Traditions’ above n 84, p 258; J A Raftis, ‘Marc Bloch’s Comparative Method and the Rural History of Medieval England 
(1962) 24 Medieval Studies 349, p 355. 
 
 32 
that law was a formal covering over diverse realities which comparative study could expose.189 But 
the impact of Bloch’s ‘Annales’ school on modern (historical) thought has been much greater than 
Vinogradoff’s – in part because of the difference between social and legal history. Hilton thought 
Vinogradoff’s legal focus did not sit well with sociologists – if true, this means Vinogradoff was 
too much of a lawyer for non-lawyers and not enough of one for lawyers themselves. Analytical 
jurisprudence and legal positivism have proven more popular than the historical approach in legal 
theory, and in legal history a doctrinal approach has prevailed.190 This is a long way from Maine’s 
hope that ‘general jurisprudence’ and legal history would become the heart of legal education.191 
As Bloch observed in the 1930s, English historical jurisprudence apparently stopped dead with 
Vinogradoff.192  
 
The decline had begun before Vinogradoff’s death, and has been variously attributed to 
problems with the concept of ‘legal evolution’; the distasteful ideas of social Darwinism; and 
outmoded or supremacist attitudes.193 O’Brien, who is in a minority in arguing that Vinogradoff 
developed ‘a specific, intellectually ambitious and coherent vision of what historical jurisprudence 
might become’,194 still argued that Vinogradoff’s German teaching style was off-putting for English 
students and contributed to the decline of the school.195  Some argue that Vinogradoff and Pollock 
failed to clearly articulate a systematic theory of law based on the historical method and this was a 
cause of decline.196 Pollock’s work is certainly susceptible to this criticism: he was not really an 
advocate of the method and was sceptical of philosophy of law in general – despite being Maine’s 
                                                        
189 Raftis, ibid, 356-357.  
190 Encyclopædia Britannica, above n 49, p 587. In a recent article, Russell Sandberg made precisely this point: ‘The time for legal history: some 
reflections on Maitland and Milsom fifty years on’ (2018) 180 Law & Justice 21, p 25.  
191 Lobban, above n 16, p 1. 
192 Raftis, above n 188, p 355.  
193 Stein, Legal Evolution, above n 19; Elliot, above n 14; Getzler, ‘Intellectual Traditions’ above n 84, p 256; Lacey, above n 15; Tamanaha, 
‘Third Pillar’, above n 4, p 2250; Samuel, above n 35; A Diamond, ‘Introduction’ in idem (ed), above n 119, p 5; C Woodard, ‘A wake (or 
awakening?) for historical jurisprudence’ in Diamond (ed), above n 119, p 217. 
194 N O'Brien, ‘‘In Vino Veritas’: Truth and Method in Vinogradoff's Historical Jurisprudence’ (2008) 29 The Journal of Legal History 39, p 42. 
195 ibid, p 39. 
196 Tamanaha, above n 4, p 2250; Lacey, above n 15, p 919. 
 
 33 
chosen successor at Oxford and holding a chair requiring he teach historical jurisprudence.197 
Cocks has even argued that Pollock actively tried to restrict Maine’s impact.198 But Vinogradoff 
did actively try to perpetuate the school: although his interests ‘[lay] in a field far removed from 
the high roads of popular learning’199 which would do little to help with exam performance, his 
methodology was undeniably an important contribution, not least because he introduced seminar 
style teaching at Oxford.200 As one of his students put it: ‘…what Vinogradoff passionately desired 
to teach was not so much a subject, as method – the methods of research in social and legal 
history.’201  
 
Vinogradoff was guilty of some of the failings characteristic of users of historical 
jurisprudence. He was determined in his historical research to see similarities between the Russian 
village community or mir and the English medieval community: his early project was to identify 
rules of progress by which Russia might benefit.202 Like Maine, he sometimes made unwarranted 
inferences: for example the belief that there were traces of an ancient communism in the form of 
land re-allotment on English manors on the same model as contemporary Russian villages.203 But 
we can also see the value of his  sustained attempt to utilise the best of both Maine’s ideas and the 
German historical school’s method in his legal historical work on villeinage, field systems, and on 
royal manors.204 
 
The sharp decline in the popularity of historical jurisprudence also relates to an attitude 
amongst the legal community that legal historical knowledge was unnecessary for the practising 
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lawyer.205 A rational, perhaps even static, description of legal doctrine is more comprehensible and 
practical for teachers, students, and practitioners. A rejection of taxonomy or rational organisation 
of legal concepts in favour of historical investigation was not generally as useful for lawyers’ 
practical purposes, although it could be used to inform legal reform.206 It has been claimed that 
historical jurisprudence was inherently resistant to legislative reform – but  whilst this was true of 
Maine (who favoured codification and rationalisation but not changes to the substance of the law 
or reform),207 Vinogradoff used it otherwise.208 The latter wanted to actively deploy historical 
jurisprudence to inform future laws by understanding what sorts of laws worked in different 
contexts.209 Recently, other scholars have seen the potential for history to provide a contextualised 
understanding of law to criticise and reform: Gordon has argued that where a legal rule is 
‘chronically maladapted’ to its purpose and/or potentially never actually operated as stated, 
doctrinal legal scholarship may fail to explain or even acknowledge this point without it – a 
sentiment Vinogradoff would have agreed with.210 The outcome of the focus on doctrine is a lack 
of exactly the appreciation of historical development which Vinogradoff thought was necessary in 




Raymond Cocks was right that Maine’s ‘failure to provide a convincing synthesis of law, 
history, and philosophy’ encouraged a more restricted understanding of the appropriate 
parameters of legal study, and limited the scope of claims that the legal past contained lessons 
                                                        
205 Maitland, above n 59, p 16; for a more recent example, Dworkin, above n 71; Samuel, above n 35, p 98. The system of registration 
introduced by the Law of Property Act 1925 can only have helped sever the tie between lawyers and history, at least in regards to land law.  
206 Parker, above n 181, p 42; and in general Collini, Winch and Burrow, above n 48; Paul Vinogradoff, ‘Aims and Methods in Jurisprudence in 
Collected Papers, above n 163, vol 2, p 324. 
207 H Maine, Popular Government (3rd edition (London: John Murray, 1886).  
208As Vinogradoff himself noted: R Pound, ‘The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence’ (1911) 24(8) Harvard Law Review 591, 601; 
P Vinogradoff, ‘Review of Interpretations of Legal History by R Pound’ (1923) 38 The English Historical Review 298.  
209 See Schauer, above n 39; D Priel, ‘Toward Classical Legal Positivism’ (2015) 101(4) Virginia Law Review 987; Letter from Paul Vinogradoff 
to Melville Madison Bigelow (2 July 1904), (Bigelow Collection, Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center, Boston University, Bigelow 
Collection, Box 2, Vinogradoff Folder). 
210 Gordon, ‘Historicism’, above n 6, p 1022. 
 
 35 
which could be made use of for the future.211 Vinogradoff’s efforts to prevent this were 
unsuccessful. Vinogradoff was aware of Pound,212 and worked with Ehrlich,213 both in the next 
generation of scholars, and both needing more ‘genuine investigation of historical development’. 
They had at least made good efforts to avoid the temptation of the ‘barren symbolism of legal 
mathematicians’.214 
 
Some challenges faced by historical jurisprudence in Vinogradoff’s time remain, including 
the association with discredited or outmoded nineteenth century ideas about legal evolution, even 
though Vinogradoff’s version of historical jurisprudence was not committed to any ‘fated scheme 
of successive stages’.215 However, the shortcomings which inevitably attach to any method for 
thinking about law do not discount the usefulness of that method in aiding our understanding. 
Historical jurisprudence can offer a way to use historical ideas of law to provide some insight into 
the nature of law, and even evidence as to which reforms are likely to succeed or fail, without 
necessarily being deterministic as to the future of a legal system.216 Even if Vinogradoff’s ideas 
remained incomplete as to change over time and contained some overenthusiastic inferences, it 
does not follow that his method cannot be usefully deployed in our thinking about law. And it is 
clear that historical ideas are used in exactly this way in modern jurisprudence, and in legal 
practice.217 But this is often done incidentally, unconsciously, and without much deference to the 
tradition of the method. 
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Does a re-evaluation of Vinogradoff’s legal theory bring to light new or forgotten ideas 
about the nature of law, or the methodology to be pursued in investigating it? The calls for a 
framework wherein comparative legal history and/or legal theory may interact profitably with legal 
history suggest that if these ideas are not new, then they are at least largely forgotten. Then again, 
perhaps not, in light of the rediscoveries made by Tamanaha and the Critical Legal History school. 
However, the rehabilitation of Vinogradoff remains justified. The preceding paragraphs 
demonstrate that historical jurisprudence can and has been used by modern authors in a variety of 
ways: it was a key progenitor of embedded assumptions about the relationship between law and 
society; it provides a way to evaluate analytical models; and it proposes difficult and unsolved 
problems about legal change which we must not ignore. Given this, it should not be a silent partner 
in our legal theoretical discourse. Whilst Vinogradoff’s historical jurisprudence was of its time, and 
many of its insights have now been either further developed or re-discovered independently by 
researchers in other schools, it is to overlook a significant contribution to our collective notions 
of law to fail to explicitly recognise this. This is especially so in light of the renewed interest in the 
use of history and legal theory together discussed here. It is time to bring Vinogradoff out of the 
footnotes and engage with historical jurisprudence as the rich and provocative legal theory he 
intended it to be. 
